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Abstract
Should governments in developing countries promote private ownership and
deregulated prices in non-competitive sectors? Or should they run publicly owned
firms and regulate prices at the expense of rents to insiders? We develop a theo-
retical model to answer these questions which are normative. The analysis focuses
on the governments’ trade-off between fiscal benefits and consumer surplus in the
privatization reforms that occurred in non-competitive sectors. Under privatization,
the control rights are transferred to private interests and public subsidies are elimi-
nated. This benefit for tax-payers comes at the cost of a price rise for consumers. We
show that, in developing countries where budget constraints are tight, privatization
and price liberalization may be optimal for low profitability industries. However
for more profitable industries, privatization and price liberalization are suboptimal.
Finally, once a market gives room for more than one firm, governments prefer to
regulate the industry. In the absence of a credible regulatory agency, regulation is
achieved through public ownership.
∗Emmanuelle Auriol: Toulouse School of Economics, ARQADE and IDEI. E-mail: eauriol@cict.fr
†Pierre M. Picard: SoSS, University of Manchester and CORE, Universite´ catholique de Louvain.
E-mail: Pierre.Picard@manchester.ac.uk
1
1 Introduction
Over the last 25 years low-income countries have drastically reduced their share of state
ownership.1 In most cases, governments have privatized public assets because of critical
budgetary conditions. While international financial organizations, like the World Bank
or the IMF, made privatization programs a condition for economic assistance during
the 1980s debt crisis, governments have been keen on using privatization proceeds to
relax their budget constraints.2 The fiscal benefits of privatization are not limited to the
divesture proceeds of state owned enterprises (S0E), which has been estimated around $50
billion per year in non-OECD countries (Mahboobi, 2000; Gibbon, 1998, 2000). They also
encompass the possible termination of recurrent, inefficient subsidies to the latter. The
paper studies the impact of macroeconomic fiscal balancing objectives on the privatization
decision in regard to infrastructure and public utilities in low-income countries.
Privatization brings well-known economic costs when industries are characterized by
strong economies of scale. Infrastructure and utilities owners benefit from market power.
By giving up the direct control of firms’ operations, governments lose control over prices to
the disadvantage of consumers. In theory this could be avoided by auctioning off markets
on the basis of the lowest product/service price (see Estache, Foster and Wodon 2002).
However Guasch (2003) shows in a survey of 600 concession contracts from around the
world that, in practice, the contracts are tendered for the highest transfer or annual fee.
Because fee payments rise with the profitability of the privatized firms, many governments
choose policies that increase the firms’ profitability such as exclusivity periods and price
liberalization.3 Prices are sometimes increased ahead of privatization in order to reduce
1Megginson and Netter (2001) estimate that between 1980 and 1996 it went from 16% to 8% of GDP.
2Using a panel of 18 developing countries, Davis et al. (2000) show that budgetary privatization
proceeds have been used to reduce domestic financing on a roughly one-for-one basis.
3Wallsten (2001) studies the impact of the exclusivity period on the privatization price of twenty
telecommunication firms in fifteen developing countries. Two thirds of the countries chose to allocate
exclusivity periods for an average of 7.42 years. Exclusivity more than double the price private investors
2
the SOE financing gaps and attract buyers. This has been for instance the case in Zim-
babwe, Kenya and Senegal, where governments increased electricity prices by 10 % after
reaching an agreement with Vivendi Universal (see AfDB-OECD 2003). An unaccounted
part of price increases stems from the termination of illegal connections (Birdsall and
Nellis 2002, Estache, Foster and Wodon 2002, AfDB-OECD 2003).
The present paper studies the privatization decision as the result of the government’s
cost-benefit analysis. The social benefit obtained from the cash-flows generated by the
public firms’ divesture and from the termination of subsidies to unprofitable public firms
are balanced against the loss in consumer surplus induced by the higher prices in priva-
tized industries and the foregone revenues from profitable public firms. Since our model is
static, it is not designed to study the transition regime between public and private owner-
ship. It compares social welfare under private and public ownership in industries/market
segments where some investments need to be sunk. To get clear-cut results privatization
corresponds to a case where ownership is private and prices are free. It is close but not
equivalent to laissez-faire because entry remains regulated (i.e. through license and entry
fees). Public ownership corresponds to a case where entry and prices are regulated. This
approach is robust from a theoretical point of view. Indeed if, as we show, privatization
with laissez-faire dominates state ownership with benevolent regulation, privatization also
dominates in situations where prices are liberalized to a lesser extent and regulation is
not benevolent.4
The dominance of privatization over benevolent regulation is not obvious. Indeed,
the deadweight loss created by monopoly pricing is the rationale for setting up public
ownership in the first place. Under perfect information, governments are able to mimic
pay for the firm, but comes at the cost of high prices and lower network growth for consumers.
4Developing countries have generally failed to establish credible regulatory bodies because of gov-
ernments’ inability to commit. For instance, the concessions granted to private operators following the
divestiture of Latin America public firms were renegotiated after an average 2.1 years only (Laffont 2001).
See also Guash (2004).
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the outcomes of private monopolies so that privatization is never optimal. However, un-
der asymmetric information between governments and firms, privatization may dominate
public ownership because the presence of information rents makes subsidies socially more
costly. In the paper, a main factor in privatization decisions is the opportunity cost of
public funds, which captures the tightness of government budget constraint. We show that
the privatization decision is a monotone function of this opportunity cost of public funds
when the profitability of a market is low, as it is for instance the case of infrastructure such
as roads or of utilities service to the poor. For low opportunity costs (i.e. for wealthy gov-
ernments) public ownership dominates privatization, whereas the reverse holds for large
opportunity costs (i.e. for financially strapped governments). To illustrate this result
consider the specific case where the government cannot finance an infrastructure project
(e.g., a water distribution network in a poor neighborhood). Privatization is an appealing
alternative as it is better to have a privately owned and operated infrastructure, even
with monopoly distortion, than no infrastructure at all. By continuity the result still
holds when the government is able to finance the infrastructure.
Nevertheless, the above monotonic relationship between privatization and tightness of
budget constraint breaks down when natural monopolies are sufficiently profitable and
when governments are not able to recoup large enough franchise fees or divestiture pro-
ceeds. Such situations often stem from the difficulty met by developing countries to attract
investors when they auction off profitable SOEs.5 We show that, with underpriced public
assets, the privatization decision is optimal only for intermediate values of the opportu-
nity cost of public funds. The intuition goes as it follows: as before, when opportunity
cost of public funds is small, the bailouts of firms by governments are cheap and it is
optimal to keep firms public, to set prices close to marginal costs and to subsidize the
5According to Trujillo, Quinet and Estache (2002), there exist rarely more than two bidders who
participate in developing countries’ auctions for major concession contracts. Therefore, SOEs are often
sold at a discount to avoid the embarrassment of unsuccessful sales (see Birdsall and Nellis 2002).
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firms to guarantee a break-even situation. For intermediate value of the opportunity cost
of public funds, bailout becomes costly and governments prefer to privatize the public
firms, cash the divesture proceeds and let private entrepreneurs manage firms. Yet, for
high enough opportunity costs of public funds, the privatization decisions differ as gov-
ernment finds it valuable to ‘hold-up’ on industries’ rents. Government does not privatize
profitable segments; it prefers to operate them, and to set private monopoly prices to reap
maximal revenues. This non-monotonicity result has potentially important policy impli-
cations. That is, while divestiture of profitable public firms may be optimal in advanced
economies, it is not necessarily so in developing countries where budget constraints are
tight and market institutions are weak. More specifically, the model suggests that pub-
lic utilities in developing countries should focus on market segments where incomes and
willingness to pay are high. They also should set prices high so that the government can
used the public firms’ profit to subsidize new connections or other public goods.
Finally, when firms’ profitability substantially rises, the market leaves room for more
than one firm. We show that, for large, profitable markets, regulation of duopoly always
dominates privatization with price liberalization. Market liberalization hence corresponds
to the divestiture of a historical monopoly and the introduction of new entrants according
to a regulatory scheme. It does not correspond to laissez-faire. This is a major concern in
developing countries because they usually lack the human resources and the institutions
to implement an effective regulation.
1.1 Relationship with the literature
It is well-known that public ownership generates inefficiencies because it encourages gov-
ernments to bail out or subsidize money-losing firms. Such inefficiencies were first coined
by Kornai (1980) as the ‘soft budget constraint’ problem. This problem explains many in-
efficiencies occurring in socialist economies such as shortages or low price responsiveness.6
6Interesting surveys are available in Kornai (2000) and Kornai, Maskin and Roland (2002).
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Since less efficient firms are allowed to rely on government funding, they lack the financial
discipline required for efficient management. For instance, under contract incomplete-
ness, soft-budget constraints affect the level of investments made by public managers. By
hardening the firm’s budget constraint, privatization helps restore investment incentives.
The transfer of public to private ownership is therefore often advocated as a remedy for
the poor economic performance of public enterprises (see for instance Dewatripont and
Maskin (1995), Schmidt (1996) and Maskin (1999)). Another concern about public owner-
ship is the governments’ lack of economic orientation. For instance in Kornai and Weibull
(1983), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Debande and Friebel (2003), governments demonstrate
‘paternalistic’ or political behaviors as they seek to protect employment; in Shapiro and
Willig (1990), governments are malevolent. The main conclusion of the above two strands
of literature is that privatization improves the internal efficiency of firms. Megginston and
Netter (2001) in a literature review covering 65 empirical studies at the firm level confirm
that private firms are generally more productive and more profitable than their public
counterparts. However, in increasing returns to scale industries, the efficiency gains are
not automatically passed along to consumers.7 Changing the ownership structure does
not solve the problem of lack of competitive pressure (see Nellis 1999).
The present paper belongs to the traditional literature on regulation with adverse se-
lection (see Laffont and Tirole 1993). It ignores the moral hazard issue that is discussed
at length in the aforementioned papers about soft budget constraint, to focus on alloca-
tive efficiency and macro-fiscal balancing issues. A utilitarian government maximizes a
weighted sum of consumer surplus and transfers from/to firms. The weight on transfers
is the opportunity cost of public funds. As it is standard in the regulation literature we
assume that the government is able to commit and to offer complete contracts so that
7Estache (2002) shows that technical/productive efficiency gains generated by Argentina’s 1990s util-
ities privatization have not been transmitted to consumers. The benefits were captured by the industry
because of inefficient regulation.
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private or public ownership is irrelevant.8 The paper hence draws the line between pub-
lic and private ownership as the choice between regulated public firms and unregulated
private ones. Since the government is residual claimant of the public firms’ profit and
loss, and since it wants to avoid the threat of service interruption, under asymmetric
information money loosing firms are subsidized while more productive firms earn infor-
mational rents. Production is distorted to reduce these information costs which in turn
diminishes consumer surplus. Privatization reduces the need to subsidize low profitability
firms and to distort their production below the monopoly level (due to the adverse selec-
tion problem). Privatization is used for projects that have low profitability or low social
benefits. To avoid the technicality of an additional principal agent problem, the private
owner is assumed to be the firm’s manager. The welfare comparison is hence between
a benevolently regulated firm and a private monopoly charging the standard monopoly
price.
Finally our model can be related to the theory of public-private partnerships (PPP)
that has deserved a recent attention in national and international funding institutions (see
Vaillancourt Rosenau 2000, IMF 2004). The idea behind PPP is to make governments
purchase the service rather than the asset that is associated to the provision of a public
good or of a good for which there is a potential market failure. On the one hand, PPPs are
seen by governments as a vehicle to shift investment costs out their books and/or safeguard
the execution of projects that would otherwise hardly materialize given their budget
constraints. On the other hand, PPPs are praised for their potential benefits in terms of
productive efficiency.9 As we rule out the possible productivity inefficiencies to focus on
8When government is able to offer the same contracts to public and to private firms, as in Baron-
Myerson (1982) and in Laffont-Tirole (1986), or in the form of bribes to private firms as in Kornai (2001),
both structures have the same degree of contract completeness so ownership is irrelevant.
9Public-private partnerships (PPP) can be used to harden the firms’ budget constraints as we discussed
earlier and can be used to bundle complementary tasks such as the construction and the operation of
infrastructure projects (see Hart 2003, Martimort and Pouyet 2006).
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the allocative inefficiencies, it is therefore no surprise that the benefits of privatization
are aligned to this first view that emphasizes the fiscal benefits of privatization.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the main assump-
tions. Section 3 compares the performance of private and regulated monopolies while
Section 4 briefly discusses the duopoly case. Section 5 derives the optimal industrial pol-
icy. Section 6 summarizes our results and offers some concluding remarks. For the sake
of conciseness, all proofs are set out in an Appendix that is made available on the website
of the World Bank Economic Review.
2 The model
The government has to decide whether an industry characterized by increasing returns to
scale should be under public or private control. We call regulation regime the regime in
which the government controls the production of a public firm. The government’s control
rights are associated with accountability on profits and losses. That is, it must subsidize
the firm in case of losses whereas it taxes the firm in case of profits. In contrast, we call
private regime the regime in which the government imposes no control on the operations
of a private firm, and it takes no responsibility for the firm’s profits or losses. That is,
no transfer is possible between the government and the private firm once production has
begun. This is of course a simplification. In practice government might subsidize the
private sector. However subsidies are lower under private than under public ownership,
which is what matters for the results.10 Similarly private firms do not pay tax on profit
but they can pay an entry fee.11
10For instance, in Burkina Faso government subsidies to SOEs went from 1.42 percent of GDP in 1991
to 0.08 percent of GDP in 1999 as a result of privatization (AfDB-OECD 2003).
11This is an artifact of the formalization. In the static model below it is optimal for the government
to sell the firm ex-ante (i.e. while it is in a position of symmetric information vis a` vis the firm) rather
than to tax its profit ex-post (i.e. once the firm has learned its cost parameter and has an informational
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Demand: We consider a normal good. The inverse demand function for Q ≥ 0 units
of the commodity is given by12
P (Q) = a− bQ (1)
where a > 0 and b > 0 are common knowledge. The gross consumer surplus is therefore
S(Q) =
∫ Q
0
P (x)dx = aQ− b
2
Q2. (2)
Firms: We focus on infrastructure and utilities. These industries require to sink large
investments. Technically they involve increasing returns to scale technology so that cost
functions are sub-additive. As in Baron and Myerson (1982), this is simply modeled by
assuming that the cost function includes a fixed costK > 0, and an idiosyncratic marginal
cost βi. To produce qi units of the commodity, firm i = 1, ..., N has the following cost
function:
C(βi, qi, K) = K + βiqi. (3)
Firm i must make the investment K before discovering βi. The βis are independently
and identically distributed on the interval [β, β¯] according to the density and cumulative
distribution functions g(·) and G(·). This law is common knowledge. We denote the
expectation operator by E, the average marginal cost by Eβ, and the variance of marginal
cost by σ2 =var(β). Neither the government nor the competitors of firm i observe βi.
The fixed cost K is large so that the maximal number of firms N that can survive
under laissez-faire is small. To be more specific we make the following assumption:
A0 K ≥ (a− Eβ)
2
16b
+
σ2
4b
.
advantage). Empirical evidence shows that developing countries rely on entry fees to raise revenues from
firms (see Auriol and Warlters 2005).
12To keep the analysis simple we consider a linear product demand. However the results are robust to
more general demand function. For instance models with iso-elastic demand functions require numerical
simulations but yield similar results. Computations are available on request.
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Assumption A0 implies that N ≤ 2.13
The firms are profit maximizers. The profit of firm i = 1, ..., N is
Πi = P (Q)qi − C(βi, qi, K) + ti (4)
where ti is the net transfer that the firm gets from the government (subsidy minus tax
and franchise fee).
Government: It is utilitarian and maximizes the sum of consumer and producer
surpluses minus the social cost of transferring public funds to the firm(s). The transfer
to the firm(s) can either be positive (i.e. a subsidy), or negative (i.e. a tax). The
government’s objective function is
W = S(Q)−
N∑
i=1
C(βi, qi, K)− λ
N∑
i=1
ti (5)
where λ is the opportunity cost of public funds. For λ close to 0, the government maxi-
mizes the consumer surplus; for larger λ, the government puts more weight on taxpayers
surplus (i.e., on transfers).
Opportunity cost of public funds: Term 1 + λ measures the social cost of trans-
ferring one unit of money from the government to the firm. That is, government pursues
multiple objectives, such as the production of public goods, the regulation of non com-
petitive industries or the control of externalities, under a single budget constraint. The
opportunity cost of public funds is the Lagrange multiplier of this constraint. It tells how
much the social welfare can be improved if the budget constraint is relaxed by one dollar.
It includes foregone benefits of alternative investment choices and spending.14 In practice,
any additional investment in infrastructure or public utilities implies a reduction of the
production of essential public goods such as national security, law enforcement or any
other commodities that generate externalities such as health care and education. It may
13To find out how A0 is computed, see the Appendix made available in WBER Website.
14It is different from the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) which measures the dead weight loss
created by a marginal increase of a specific tax rate (see Warlters and Auriol 2005).
10
also imply a rise in the level of taxes or public debt. All these actions have a social cost,
which must be traded off with the social benefit. Symmetrically when the government is
able to tax an industry, the social benefit generated by the additional revenue must be
compared with the reduction in consumer surplus.
In advanced economies, λ is usually assumed to be equal to the deadweight loss due to
imperfect income taxation. It is assessed to be around 0.3 (Snower and Warren, 1996). In
developing countries, low income levels and difficulties in implementing effective taxation
programs are strong constraints on the government budget. The tax revenue-GDP ratio
for 1995, for example, was 36.1 % for OECD countries (see the OECD website) versus
18.2 % for developing countries (based on a sample Tanzi and Zee 2001). Since the
opportunity cost of public funds is higher when, everything else being equal, government
revenue is lower, the opportunity cost of developing countries should be higher than 0.3.
As a benchmark case the World Bank (1998) suggests an opportunity cost of 0.9. However
the value is much higher in countries that are heavily indebted.
3 Privatization of natural monopoly
When K is large, a natural monopoly emerges: N ∈ {0, 1}. Regulation aims at correcting
the distortion associated with monopoly pricing. Theory suggests that welfare should
never be smaller under regulation than under laissez-faire because, at worse, a benevolent
regulator should be able to mimic the choice of a private firm. We show that it is not
always the case under asymmetric information.
3.1 Private monopoly
The production level of a private monopoly (henceforth PM) is not controlled by the
government. The government can nevertheless control the entry of the firm by auctioning
the right to operate. Let F (λ) ≥ 0 be the (exogenous) franchise fee that the private firm
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pays to the government in order to operate in the product market. This franchise fee
depend on the economic condition of the country through the value of λ. The private
monopoly contemplates the following sequential choices. First, the monopoly chooses to
enter the market by paying the franchise fee F (λ) and by making the investment K. If
it enters, then nature chooses the marginal cost β according to the distribution G(·).
The private firm learns β and chooses a production level Q. After the realization of β
the private firm never pays or receives a transfer from the government.15 The private
monopoly’s profit is
ΠPM = max
Q
P (Q)Q− βQ−K − F (λ).
The optimal production is independent of K and F (λ):
QPM =
a− β
2b
. (6)
If a is smaller than the firm’s marginal cost β, the production level falls to 0. In order to
rule out corner solution in the sequel of the paper, we assume that a is not too small:
A1 a ≥ max
{
2β, β + G(β)
g(β)
}
.
Substituting QPM in equations (4) and (5), we get the ex-ante profit and welfare of a
private monopoly,
EΠPM = V −K − F (λ), (7)
EW PM(λ) =
3
2
V −K + λF (λ) (8)
where
V =
E(a− β)2
4b
(9)
is the profit of operating the firm after the fixed investment is made. A monopoly is
privately feasible if it is ex-ante profitable. This requires that V ≥ K and that F (λ) ∈
15Auriol and Picard (2005) discuss the privatization of a monopoly with ex-post renegotiation and
endogenous franchise fee.
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[0, V −K]. Similarly a monopoly is socially valuable if it brings ex-ante positive welfare.
Comparing (7) and (8), it is easy to check that monopolies are socially valuable but
privately infeasible if V < K < 3
2
V .
Decreasing franchise fees: Because public funds are costly, the ex-ante welfare,
EW PM(λ), increases linearly with F (λ). The maximal entry fee that the government
can collect is the maximum price a risk neutral entrepreneur would agree to pay for the
monopoly concession: F ∗ = max{0, V − K}. In practice international capital flows de-
pend on country risk ratings so that developing countries’ government do not collect F ∗
(see Brewer and Rivoli 1990).16 Because of the service of their debt, the perception of
corruption in the administration, the social instability, the lack of transparency and pre-
dictability of their political and judicial institutions, private investors, especially foreign
ones, are very reluctant to invest in developing countries.17 In the context of our model a
bad rating translates into a large λ. That is, countries characterized by a large λ are also
countries that get low privatization proceeds. To capture this idea we make the following
assumption.18
A2 F (λ) ∈ [0, F ∗] is non-increasing and weakly convex in λ ≥ 0.
16The ratings reflect the ability and willingness of a country to service its financial obligation. See for
instance Global Risk Assessments web site, www.grai.com/links.htm.
17For instance in 1999 foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to the 49 least developed countries (10%
of the world population) was 0.5% of total world FDI flows. Since less than 10% of this investment was
cross-border merger and acquisition (including privatization), privatization proceeds are lower in poor
countries than in rich ones, despite sometimes a large number of privatizations.
18The theory of predatory governments provides another justification for the assumption A2 (see for
instance Evans 1989).
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3.2 Regulated monopoly
Under public ownership, the government, which is accountable for the profits and losses of
the firm, monitors the production of the regulated monopoly (RM hereafter). The timing
is as follows: The government first decides to make the investment K. Second, nature
chooses the marginal cost β according to the distribution function G(·). Third, the firm’s
manager learns β, but the government does not. The government proposes a production
and transfer scheme (Q(·), t(·)). Finally the regulated firm reveals the information β̂
and production takes place according to the contract (Q(β̂), t(β̂)). We first study the
benchmark case of regulation under symmetric information.
3.2.1 Symmetric information
When the government observes the realization of β, it solves max{Q,t} W s.t. Π ≥ 0
with W and Π defined in (5) and (4). Since λ is positive, transfers to the regulated
firm are costly and must be reduced down to the break-even point, Π = 0. That is,
tRM∗ = −P (Q)Q+K + βQ. Substituting this expression in (5) and maximizing W with
respect to Q yields
QRM∗(β) =
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
a− β
b
. (10)
Inserting QRM∗ in (5) and computing the expected value of W, gives the ex-ante welfare
under symmetric information
EWRM∗(λ) = (1 + λ)
(
2
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
V −K
)
(11)
where V is defined in equation (9). The government invests K in a regulated firm only if
(11) is positive. The ex-ante welfare increases linearly in V and is non-monotone in λ if
V > K: it decreases for small λ and increases for large λ. This deserves a comment.
For small λ, the government incurs small social costs of transferring money to the
regulated firm. It then chooses quantities that are close to the first best level which
means a price that is close to marginal cost. That is, limλ→0QRM∗ = (a− β) /b and
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therefore P (a−β
b
) = β. At this price, the regulated monopoly cannot recover its fixed
cost. The loss is compensated by a public transfer to the firm t = K > 0. By continuity,
the government will subsidize the regulated firm as long as λ remains small enough. In
contrast, for large λ, the government is more interested in receiving transfers from the
public firm than in maximizing consumer surplus. In the limit it seeks the maximal
revenue from the state-owned firm so that it chooses the production level of a private
monopoly: limλ→∞QRM∗ = (a− β) /2b = QPM . It mimics the private firm behavior.
3.2.2 Asymmetric information
Under asymmetric information, β is not observed by the government. To entice the firm to
truthfully reveal its cost, incentive compatibility constraint must be added to the problem.
Taking this constraint into account implies that in the government objective function the
marginal cost β is replaced by the virtual cost (see Laffont and Tirole, 1993):
c(β, λ) = β +
λ
1 + λ
G(β)
g(β)
. (12)
The virtual cost includes the marginal cost of production, β, and the marginal cost of
information acquisition, λ
1+λ
G(β)
g(β)
. To avoid the technicalities of ‘bunching’ we make the
classical monotone hazard rate assumption:19
A3 G(β)/g(β) is non decreasing.
We deduce that c(β, λ) ≥ β, and by A3, that c(β, λ) increases in β and λ. Let
V RM(λ) =
E(a− c(β, λ))2
4b
. (13)
19When the hazard rate is not monotone increasing, the virtual cost (12), and thus the regulated output
(14), are not monotone. Then output is not an invertible function of the type β and the government is
unable to infer the type of each firm by observing its output level. Being unable to ’separate’ the types
of firms, it is obliged to ’bunch’ various types in a same contract.
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It is the function V in (9) evaluated at c(β, λ) instead of β. This implies that V RM(λ)
decreases in λ. Following the Baron and Myerson’s (1982) approach, we deduce the
following lemma, which proof is standard (see Laffont and Tirole, 1993).
Lemma 1 Under asymmetric information, the optimal production and the ex-ante wel-
fare of a regulated monopoly are those of the symmetric information case evaluated at the
virtual cost c(β, λ):
QRM(β) = QRM∗(c(β, λ)), (14)
EWRM(λ) = (1 + λ)
(
2 + 2λ
1 + 2λ
V RM(λ)−K
)
. (15)
Since c(β, λ) ≥ β, we deduce that QRM(β) ≤ QRM∗(β) for any β. Moreover, since
c(β, λ) increases in β, the distortion is higher at larger marginal costs. Indeed by lowering
the production of inefficient firms, the government reduces the overall incentive to inflate
cost report. This strategy lowers the firm’s informational rent and the cost of information
revelation. Comparing (9) and (13) it is easy to verify that V RM(λ) ≤ V for all λ ≥ 0.
Hence, the ex-ante welfare of a regulated monopoly is lower under asymmetric information
than under symmetric information: EWRM(λ) ≤ WRM∗(λ).
3.3 Regulation versus privatization
We are now ready to compare the welfare level generated by a private monopoly with
that of a regulated monopoly. We first consider the symmetric information case.
Proposition 2 Under symmetric information, public regulated monopoly dominates pri-
vately feasible monopoly, whether the latter is franchised or not.
Proposition 2 is intuitive. Under symmetric information a benevolent government
cannot do worse than a private monopoly because, for any realization of β, it can always
replicate the outcome of the private firm. Nevertheless, for large opportunity costs of
public funds, a regulated monopoly under symmetric information does not bring much
16
more welfare than a private monopoly when the latter pays the maximal franchise fee,
F ∗.20 In other words, the welfare of a regulated monopoly coincides with the welfare of a
private monopoly for large λ. From this argument, we can infer that the additional cost
introduced by the asymmetry of information in the regulated monopoly gives a welfare
advantage to the private monopoly for sufficiently large λ. That is, under asymmet-
ric information, the welfare function of the regulated monopoly has an asymptote with
(negative or positive) slope limλ→+∞EWRM(λ)/λ. It is easy to check that
lim
λ→+∞
EWRM(λ)
λ
= V RM(∞)−K (16)
is smaller than V − K. We deduce that privately feasible monopolies can dominate
regulated monopolies. Let the fixed cost K satisfy the following condition.
C0 V ≥ K ≥ V
(
2
√
B+V RM (∞)
V
− B+V
V
)
with B = E
[
a−β
b
G(β)
g(β)
]
.
The interval defined in condition C0 is non empty. Indeed, 2
√
B+V RM (∞)
V
− B+V
V
< 1 is
equivalent to ( B
2V
)2 + V−V
RM (∞)
V
> 0, which is always true since V > V RM(∞). The left
hand side of condition C0 implies that the fixed cost is small enough so that a monopoly
is privately feasible (see (7)). The right hand side implies that the fixed cost is large
enough so that the monopoly is not too profitable. Proposition 3 presents the main result
of the paper: Under condition C0 privatization dominates benevolent regulation for at
least some value of the opportunity cost of public funds.
Proposition 3 Suppose that assumptions A0 to A3 hold and that the fixed cost, K, lies
in the non-empty range defined by Condition C0. Then two cases are possible:
(i) limλ→+∞ F (λ) ≥ V RM(∞)−K: there exists a unique threshold, λ̂, such that privati-
zation dominates regulation if and only if λ > λ̂.
(ii) limλ→+∞ F (λ) < V RM(∞) −K: there are two thresholds λ̂ and λ˜, λ̂ < λ˜, such that
privatization dominates regulation if and only if λ ∈ [λ̂, λ˜].
20When F = F ∗, EWRM∗(λ) = ((1 + λ)/ (1 + 2λ))V +(1 + λ)(V −K), whereas EWPMF∗ (λ) = V/2 +
(1 + λ)(V −K). The two functions have a common asymptote with slope V −K (see figure 1).
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In other words, for any value of the franchise fee function F (.) (which includes the
case F (.) ≡ 0), there exists a range of fixed costs K and of costs of public funds λ so that
the government prefers privatization. Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 3. The bold solid
curve represents the ex-ante welfare of regulated monopoly under symmetric information
(RM∗) and the bold dotted curve displays ex-ante welfare under asymmetric information
(RM). The ex-ante welfare of regulated monopoly is non-monotone in λ. It is higher for
low or high values of λ than for intermediate ones. The thin solid straight lines represent
the two boundaries of the ex-ante welfare of a private monopoly (PM) (i.e. for F (λ) ≡ F ∗
and for F (λ) ≡ 0 ∀λ ≥ 0). Depending on the franchise fee function, F (λ), the welfare
function associated to a private monopoly varies between these two bounds.
-
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Figure 1: Welfare for Private and Regulated Monopoly
λ
EWRM
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Proposition 3 establishes that privatization with price liberalization dominates a benev-
olent regulation under public ownership for (at least) intermediate values of opportunity
costs of the public funds. On the one hand, when the franchise fee F (λ) is large (i.e.
F (λ) ≥ V RM(∞)−K, ∀λ ≥ 0), the opportunity costs supporting privatization belong to
an unbounded range [λ̂,+∞). The optimal industrial policy is monotone in λ. On the
other hand, when the franchise fee falls below the threshold V RM(∞) −K, the optimal
industrial policy is non monotone in λ. For intermediate values of λ privatization with
price liberalization dominates regulation under public ownership. The opposite conclu-
sion holds for lower and larger value of λ. Observe that the preference for private feasible
monopolies is not explained by the possibility of collecting franchise fees. As shown in
the Appendix, even with no fee, F (λ) ≡ 0, the interval [λ̂0,λ˜0] where privatization dom-
inates regulation is non empty (see figure 1). The intuition for this result is as follows.
A private entrepreneur enters the business if his/her firm is ex-ante profitable. After the
investment, the private firm makes a large or a low operating profit depending on the
realization of technical/demand uncertainties. A private entrepreneur, who bets her own
assets (or the shareholders’ ones) in the firm, is accountable for these profits and losses.
In contrast, under regulation, accountability lies on the government side; the business
risk is borne by the government that has to grant ex-post subsidies to unprofitable firms.
Under asymmetric information, the regulated firm uses the transfers to acquire a positive
informational rent. The government prefers that the private sector takes over when the
social cost associated with the rent outweighs the social benefit of controlling the firm’s
operation. As suggested by condition C0 and shown Section 5 this ultimately depends on
the profitability of the industry market segment.
3.4 Numerical Assessment for λ̂
Proposition 3 shows that independently of the privatization proceeds and fees, privatiza-
tion with prices liberalization dominates a benevolent regulation under public ownership
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for intermediate value of λ. The relevance of this result depends on what ’intermediate’
value means. If λ is very high, in practice privatization will never be optimal. The lowest
value of the opportunity cost, λ̂, for which privatization becomes attractive, is obtained
when the highest franchise fee F ∗ applied (see figure 1). It solves EWRM(λ) = EW PMF ∗ (λ).
This equation is equivalent to
4(1 + λ)2V RM(λ) = (3 + 2λ)(1 + 2λ)V. (17)
To get explicit value for λ̂, we make the assumption of a uniform distribution of β over
[β, β].21 Using (12) and (13), under the uniform distribution, equation (17) is equivalent
to: 4E((1+2λ)(a−β)−λ(a−β))2 = (3+2λ)(1+2λ)E(a−β)2. One can divide the right
hand side and the left hand side by a2 and check that λ̂ depends on β/a and β/a only.
Since under the uniform specification the demand intercept a satisfies A1 if and only if
a ≥ 2β, we get that 0 ≤ β/a < β/a ≤ 0.5. Table 1 displays λ̂ for the various admissible
values of β/a and β/a.
λ̂ β/a = 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
β¯/a = 0.1 1.14 - - - -
0.2 0.71 1.07 - - -
0.3 0.52 0.66 0.99 - -
0.4 0.42 0.48 0.60 0.90 -
0.5 0.35 0.38 0.44 0.54 0.81
Table 1: Minimal opportunity costs λ̂ above which privatization can be preferred
The opportunity cost of public funds is generally assessed to be around 0.3 in in-
dustrial countries (see for instance Snower and Warren (1996)) and higher in developing
countries. We conclude that if demand and cost functions are reasonably approximated
by linear functions and satisfy assumption A1, which is an empirical issue, λ̂ lies below the
21The simulation results are robust to other statistical specifications (e.g. normal distribution).
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range of the opportunity costs prevailing in developing countries. The results in Table
1 also highlight that privatization is more likely as technological uncertainty rises (i.e.
λ̂ decreases with (β − β)/a). Indeed larger cost uncertainty implies stronger informa-
tion asymmetry between firms and governments and hence larger information rent in the
regulated structures.
4 Liberalization reform: the duopoly case
We next briefly explore the optimal industrial organization when the fixed costK becomes
smaller or equivalently, when the value of operating the firm after investment, V , becomes
larger.22 We compare a regulated duopoly a` la Auriol and Laffont (1993), with a private
duopoly, modeled as Cournot duopoly with asymmetric information between firms.23 To
simplify the exposition, franchising is ruled out in the sequel.
A4 F (λ) ≡ 0 .
In the present model, the benefit of choosing a regulated duopoly (henceforth RD) orig-
inates from the sampling gain as first analyzed by Auriol and Laffont (1993). That is,
variable costs are lower in a duopoly because the regulator is able to choose the most
efficient supplier among two firms. Monitoring a regulated duopoly then is equivalent to
monitoring a regulated monopoly for which the investment level is 2K and the marginal
cost is min{β1, β2}. Since we assumed that β1 and β2 are independently and identically
distributed, min{β1, β2} is distributed according to gmin(β) = 2(1−G(β))g(β). Let
V RD(λ) =
∫ β¯
β
(a− c(β, λ))2
4b
gmin(β)dβ. (18)
22In the last two decades some industries such as telecommunication have experienced dramatic tech-
nological and/or demand changes resulting both in a decrease in fixed costs and an increase in demand.
23For the sake of conciseness, we exclude the case of mixed duopolies with a regulated and a private
firm. See Cremer et al. (1989) and Picard (2001) for a policy discussion about mixed duopolies.
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It is the monopoly expression V RM(λ) in (13) where the density function g(β) has been
replaced by gmin(β). For the sake of exposition, the next result is established under the
assumption that G(β) is the uniform distribution. The Proposition applies for a more
general distribution.24
Proposition 4 Assume that the firms’ marginal cost are independently and uniformly
distributed over [0, β] and that assumption A1 and A4 hold, then a private duopoly is
never optimal.
In a regulated duopoly only the firm with the lowest marginal cost produces. This max-
imizes productive efficiency. By contrast, in private duopoly equilibrium there is exces-
sive entry and inefficient allocation of production. The advantage of private structures
hence disappears once the market allows the entry of more than one firm.25 For very
profitable market segment, the optimal choice is thus between regulated monopoly and
regulated duopoly. Let K
RM/RD
(λ) be the value of the fixed cost such that the govern-
ment is indifferent between a regulated monopoly and a regulated duopoly (i.e. such that
EWRM(λ) = EWRD(λ)) :
K
RM/RD
(λ) =
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
(
V RD(λ)− V RM(λ)
)
(19)
Under asymmetric information, the sampling gain is measured by K
RM/RD
(λ) so that mar-
ket liberalization is optimal whenever the entry fixed cost K is lower than K
RM/RD
(λ).26
24See the Appendix on WBER Website.
25This result may look at odds with theories where private structures perform better with larger
number of entrants (see for instance Vickers and Yarrow (1991) and Segal (1998)). A basic difference in
our model lies in the intensity of competition that exists within private and regulated structures. Private
firms compete in quantities so that the addition of a firm does not fully eliminate market power and
profits. In contrast, information costs dramatically fall when a second firm is added in the regulated
market (see Auriol and Laffont 1993).
26Since the distribution function gmin(β) stochastically dominates g(β) and since (a − c(β, λ))2/4b
decreases in β we deduce that V RD(λ) ≥ V RM (λ). However the larger λ is, the lower is the impact of
the sampling gain and the smaller is the government’s preference for regulated duopoly.
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5 Optimal industrial policy
Under complete information, the government can always replicate the production decisions
of private firms so that privatization is never optimal. The optimal industrial policy varies
from no production, regulated monopoly to regulated duopoly according to whether the
investment cost K is large, medium or small. Under asymmetric information, information
costs alter this result. Still the optimal decision depends on the fixed cost K. Let K
RM
(λ)
be the threshold such that the government is indifferent between a regulated monopoly
and no production (i.e. such that EWRM(λ) = 0). It is easy to check that
K
RM
(λ) =
2 + 2λ
1 + 2λ
V RM(λ) (20)
where V RM(λ) is defined equation (13). Similarly let K
RM/PM
(λ) be the value of the fixed
cost such that the government is indifferent between a regulated monopoly and a private
monopoly (i.e. such that EWRM(λ) = EW PM). It is easy to check that
K
RM/PM
(λ) =
2(1 + λ)2
λ(1 + 2λ)
V RM(λ)− 3V
2λ
. (21)
The next result is presented under the assumption that G(β) is the uniform distribution.
This result nevertheless applies to more general distribution.27
Proposition 5 Assume that the firms’ marginal cost are independently and uniformly
distributed over [0, β] and that assumption A1 and A4 hold. Then the optimal industrial
policy under asymmetric information is to set:
• no production if K > max
{
V,K
RM
(λ)
}
• a private monopoly if KRM/PM (λ) < K ≤ V
• a regulated monopoly if KRM/RD(λ)< K ≤min
{
K
RM/PM
(λ), V
}
or if V ≤ K < KRM (λ)
27See the Appendix on WBER Website.
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• a regulated duopoly if K ≤ KRM/RD(λ).
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Figure 2: Optimal Industrial Policy
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Because developing countries have large opportunity costs of public funds, they may
implement industrial policies that strongly differ from those implemented in advanced
economies. This statement is depicted in Figure 2 that illustrates Proposition 6 in (λ,K)
space. For the sake of exposition, we limit our discussion to four cases that depend on
the profitability of the market segment. Profitability is assessed by the difference between
the operating profit of the private firm, V , and the fixed cost level, K. In the following
discussion, V is fixed to a constant and K is successively decreased.
The first case occurs for large fixed costs K > V . The market segment is not privately
profitable and is socially beneficial only if the shadow cost of public funds λ is small
enough. The optimal industrial policy is therefore to set up a public regulated firm for
low λ or to supply nothing at all for high λ. Public regulated monopolies that are desirable
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under asymmetric information are depicted by the white area denoted RM while the case
for no production corresponds to the area denoted ∅. This is a case for public provision and
ownership of firms in unprofitable segments. Examples are rural infrastructure projects
(e.g., a secondary road, rural electrification) that are supplied only by wealthy nations
and that are usually used at marginal cost by rural population. Poor countries face an
opportunity cost of subsidizing such infrastructure that is higher than their social returns.
As a result, they choose not to offer such infrastructure or try to get rid of the unprofitable
public firms in charge of them.
The second case occurs for smaller fixed costs that belong to the range [K
RM
(∞), V ].
In this case, a private firm finds it profitable to enter and supplies its output at the
monopoly price. In contrast to the first case, countries now have the alternative to orga-
nize supply through the use of a private firm. The optimal industrial policy is monotone
in the opportunity cost of public funds λ: a public regulated firm is preferred if λ is small
enough and privatization is preferred otherwise. In Figure 2, the case for public regulated
firm is still represented in the white area and denoted RM and the case for privatization
is represented by hatched area above the curve K
RM/PM
and denoted PM . Here privati-
zation becomes an appealing alternative compared to public provision. Indeed, consider
the situation of a poor country’s government that is unable to finance an infrastructure
project, as in the case of small water networks or generation facilities (i.e. K lies above
the curve KRM and below V ; λ is high enough). If a private firm proposes to invest in the
infrastructure in exchange for the freedom to charge monopoly pricing it is optimal to let
this firm do so. Indeed, it is better to have a privately owned and operated infrastructure
with monopoly price distortion than no infrastructure at all. By continuity this conclu-
sion still holds when the government gets a (not too large) benefit from financing the
infrastructure. Developing countries offer many examples of such privatization processes
through their use of concession, lease, or greenfield contracts. For instance many devel-
oping countries have started build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) programs where private
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firms finance the sunk costs associated to highways, in exchange for a 10-30 years licence
to exploit it in a monopoly position.28 Similarly China, Malaysia, Thailand implemented
such programs in water, and Chile, Mexico, in sanitation (World Bank 1997). In many
places, the privatization process is less formal. For instance, in Sub-Saharan Africa, wa-
ter and electricity services are offered by an informal sector made of thousands of small
scale private and unregulated providers (see Auriol and Blanc 2007). As predicted by the
theory they serve the middle class and the poor at prices that are much higher than the
public utilities’ prices. A recent survey estimates that nearly half of urban dwellers in
Africa rely on such private services for water (Kariuki and Schwartz 2005).
We can now discuss our third case whereK is lower thanK
RM
(∞). Observe at the out-
set that, contrary to the second case, the optimal industrial policy is no longer monotone in
λ. This property, which has already been discussed in Proposition 3, is reflected in Figure
2 by the fact that the curve denoted K
RM/PM
is non monotone in λ. For the sake of exposi-
tion, let us define K
RM/PM
as the minimum of K
RM/PM
(i.e. K
RM/PM
= minλK
RM/PM
(λ))
and let us discuss fixed costs belonging to the interval [K
RM/PM
, K
RM
(∞)]. Then, as
the shadow cost of public funds λ increases, the optimal industrial structure successively
switches from a public regulated firm to a private firm and then switches back to a public
regulated firm. The difference with the second case above lies in the fact that when λ is
sufficiently large the government seeks to extract the maximal revenue from the public
firm by setting high prices. This case shows that whereas the divestiture of a profitable
public firm may be optimal in countries with intermediate costs of public funds, it is not
necessarily optimal in developing countries where budget constraints are tight and market
institutions are weak. The fixed-line and long distant segment of the telecommunication
industry illustrates the non monotonicity result: “A PTT’s yearly revenues (especially
charges from international call) were used by governments to subsidize mail service, or
to ease yearly budget deficits. Given this public convenience and necessity, the interests
28Trujillo et al. (2003) show that transport privatization leads to a reduced need for public investment.
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of third world governments are often diametrically opposed to telecom policies of priva-
tization and network deregulation favored by wealthy nations.” (Anania 1992). Although
advanced economies also care for the revenues generated by their utilities,29 their effective
taxation systems make them less greedy to the potential revenues of natural monopoly
markets.30 The paper shows that in poor developing countries, privatization of public
utilities profit centers is socially inefficient. By eliminating cross-subsidies between vari-
ous market segments or industries, privatizations have hence generally increased the fiscal
costs related to unprofitable segments and have reduced political support from harmed
(usually poor) consumers (Estache and Wodon 2006, Trujillo et al. 2003).
The final case in our discussion takes place at sufficiently low fixed costs. With a large
surplus at stake, Proposition 4 shows that a private Cournot duopoly is never optimal.
Governments choose between regulated public structures with one or two firms depend-
ing on whether shadow costs of public funds are small or large. In Figure 2, a regulated
duopoly is preferred to regulated monopoly in the hatched area below the curve K
RM/RD
denoted RD. This last case sheds light on the relationship between market liberalization
on the one hand, and technological improvement and/or product demand growth, illus-
trated by a fall in the ratio K/V , on the other hand. Market liberalization corresponds to
the divestiture of the historical monopoly and the introduction of new entrants, but is not
equivalent to laissez-faire. Prices and entry should remain regulated to protect consumers
against firms’ tendency to reduce competition by setting their capacity levels or even to
organize collusion and exert predatory behavior (not modeled in this paper). With a large
surplus at stake, ownership is not the key to the allocative efficiency problem; regulation
29In the USA a federal excise tax on telephony services was created in 1898. Tax’s opponents argue that
it is distortive, while its proponents insist on the revenues need. It is hard to get around this argument:
At a tax rate of 3% tax collection reached USD 5.185 billions in year 1999 (USA government budget).
30On the whole this non-tax revenue is more important for developing than opposed to industrial coun-
tries, comprising about 21 percent compared to 10 percent of total revenue (Burgess-Stern 1993 pp 782).
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is the key. Empirical evidence supports this result.31
6 Conclusion
In this paper we compare the welfare of a public firm with regulated prices to the welfare
of a private firm with liberalized prices for different values of opportunity costs of public
funds. We show that the privatization decision non-trivially depends on the value of
opportunity costs of public funds and on the profitability in the market segment where
the firm operates. Since the opportunity cost of public funds is higher in developing
countries than in developed countries, optimal privatization policies are likely to differ
between those countries. We have highlighted four cases.
First, a market segment can have a so low profitability that no private firm is able
or willing to cover it. Such a situation is typically encountered in secondary road or
electrification projects in a low density area. A public firm is then the natural option
provided that the opportunity cost of public funds is not too high. Otherwise, the service
is not offered. Empirical evidences are consistent with this result. The fraction of people
in poor, rural areas that do not have access to any service is larger in developing countries
than in advanced economies.
Second, the market segments can be sufficiently profitable to allow the entry of a pri-
vate firm. We show that privatization with price liberalization then dominates regulation
if and only if the opportunity cost of public funds is large enough. As a result, the provi-
sion of utility services and infrastructures is more market oriented in developing countries
than in developed ones. This is consistent with factual evidences. For instance Kariuki
and Schwartz (2005) estimate that nearly half of urban dwellers in Africa (i.e., the middle
class and the poor) rely on private providers for water service. The private (informal)
31For instance, in telecommunication industry in African and in Latin America, Wallsten (2001) found
that privatization does not yield improvements but that privatization combined with an independent
regulator does. For more on telecommunication reforms in developing countries see Auriol (2005).
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providers are bridging the utilities service gap at a high cost; their prices are up to 10
times the prices of public providers. The result is also consistent with developing countries
use of concession, lease, or greenfield contracts, such as build-operate-and-transfer (BOT)
programs for highways, sanitation or water networks.
Third, when market segments are even more profitable, we show that privatization
choice is restricted to intermediate opportunity costs of public funds. The government
finds it optimal to set up a public firm for large enough opportunity costs of public
funds. Very poor countries are plagued with financial problems and welcome the potential
revenues that can be extracted from a public firm. Privatization of profitable public
utilities, such as fixed lines or international telecommunication services, is therefore not
efficient.
Finally, the market segment can be so profitable that a second firm is able to enter
the market. Then, privatization with price liberalization is not optimal. As shown in
the booming mobile telecommunication industry, regulation is a keystone for successful
liberalization reforms.
In contrast to many contributions on privatization, our discussion has focused on the
two issues of allocative efficiency and macroeconomic financial constraint. The empirical
literature in development studies provides replete evidence of the relationship between
those two issues in natural monopoly and oligopoly markets located in developing coun-
tries. Nevertheless, as noted in the Introduction, improvements in productive efficiency
associated to privatization have also been highlighted in the theoretical and empirical
literature. We hope that the present contribution may help the reader to find a balance
between those issues.
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Supplementary Section
This supplementary section presents the proofs of Proposition 2, 3, 4 and 5 as well as the formal
description of the duopoly case set out in Section 4 of the paper ”Infrastructure and Public
Utilities Privatization in Developing Countries” by Auriol E. and Picard P. M. Figures and
mathematical expressions referred in this supplementary section are to be found in the latter
paper.
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 2
We have to show that (1+λ)
(
2 1+λ1+2λV −K
)
≥ V −K+λF (λ) ∀λ ≥ 0. The maximal franchise
fee, denoted F ∗, is equal to the firm’s ex-ante profit, i.e. F ∗ = V − K. Therefore the above
inequality is satisfied if ∀λ ≥ 0 (1 + λ)
(
2 1+λ1+2λV −K
)
≥ 32V −K + λ (V −K) , or equivalently
if 4 (1 + λ)2 ≥ (3 + 2λ) (1 + 2λ) which is always true ∀λ ≥ 0.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 3
We prove this proposition in four steps.
Step 1: Regulation is preferred to privatization if and only if EW
RM
(λ) ≥ EW PM (λ). By
virtue of equation (15) this inequality is equivalent to
2
(1 + λ)2
1 + 2λ
V RM (λ)− (1 + λ)K ≥ 3
2
V −K + λF (λ). (22)
Developing V
RM
(λ) defined in equation (13) one can check that:
V
RM
(λ) =
1 + 2λ
(1 + λ)2
V +
λ2
(1 + λ)2
V
RM
(∞)− λ
2(1 + λ)2
B (23)
where terms V = E
[
(a− β)2/(4b)], and V RM (∞) = E [((a− β − G(β)g(β) )2) /(4b)], and B =
E [G(β)(a− β)/(g(β)b)] are all positive by virtue of assumption A1. Substituting (23) in (22)
and dividing the right and left hand side by λ, we get after some straightforward computations:
Reg  Priv ⇔
V
2λ
≥ B
1 + 2λ
− 2λ
1 + 2λ
V RM (∞) +K + F (λ). (24)
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It is easy to check that the left hand side of (24), denoted LHS(λ), is a decreasing and convex
function of λ. Similarly, under the assumption A2 the right hand side of (24), denoted RHS(λ),
is decreasing and convex. The following proof relies on the property that two decreasing and
convex functions can intersect only once, twice or none.
Step 2: For λ = 0, expression (24) is equivalent to V ≥ 0 which is always true. We deduce that
for λ small enough regulation dominates privatization.
For λ → +∞ two cases hold: either limλ→+∞ LHS(λ) > limλ→+∞RHS(λ), which is
equivalent to F (+∞) < R∞, or limλ→+∞ LHS(λ) ≤ limλ→+∞RHS(λ), which is equivalent
to R∞ ≤ F (+∞) where R∞ = V RM (∞)−K.
Consider first the case R∞ ≤ F (+∞). This condition implies that for λ large enough
privatization is preferred to regulation. Since it is the reverse for λ low enough, we deduce that
LHS(λ) and RHS(λ) cross once and only once. This proves part (i) of proposition 3.
Step 3: Consider next the case R∞ > F (∞). This condition implies that for large enough
λ, regulation is preferred to privatization. Since this is also true for low enough λ, we deduce
the following possibilities: first, LHS(λ) and RHS(λ) never cross, in which case regulation is
always preferred to privatization, second, they cross twice which yields part (ii) of proposition
3. This ultimately depends on K.
Step 4: To complete the proof of proposition 3 we need to show that there are at least some
values of the parameters such that LHS(λ) and RHS(λ) cross twice. Since privatization is less
attractive for smaller franchise fees, a sufficient condition is that LHS(λ) and RHS(λ) crossing
twice for F = 0. Simplifying expression (24) and using F (λ) ≡ 0, we get that privatization is
preferred to public ownership if and only if
P (λ) = 2(V RM (∞)−K)λ2 + (V −B −K)λ+ V/2 < 0. (25)
Inequality (25) is satisfied for λ ∈ (λ̂, λ˜) with 0 < λ̂ < λ˜ under three conditions:
(a) (V −B −K)2 > 4V (V RM (∞)−K).
(b) V −B −K < 0
(c) V RM (∞)−K > 0
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Condition (a) yields a positive discriminant for P (λ) = 0 and thus implies the existence of
two roots λ̂ and λ˜; condition (b) and (c) imply positivity for both roots of P (λ) = 0; finally
since P (0) > 0 and limλ→+∞ P (λ) > 0 under (c), we have that P (λ) < 0 for λ ∈ (λ̂, λ˜).
Conditions (b) and (c) are satisfied if and only if K ∈ (V −B, V RM (∞)). This interval is not
empty since V RM (∞) = V −B/2+E [(G(β)/g(β))2/(4b)] > V −B. Then, observe that the left
hand side of condition (a) is equal to zero at K = V −B and increases for larger K. Similarly the
right hand side of condition (a) decreases with K and is equal to zero at K = V RM (∞). Hence
there exists a unique K̂ ∈ (V − B, V RM (∞)) such that (V −B −K)2 = 4V (V RM (∞) − K).
Solving this equation one can check that
K̂ = V
2
√
B + V RM (∞)
V
− B + V
V
 (26)
To conclude we have just shown that conditions (a), (b) and (c) are satisfied for any K ∈
(K̂, V RM (∞)), which is a non empty set. Finally note that, because F (∞) ≥ 0, K ≤ V RM (∞).
That is, condition (c)) is implied by the condition R∞ > F (∞) (i.e., condition (ii) in Proposition
3). The complementary case, K > V RM (∞), is implied by condition (i) in Proposition 3. We
deduce that K ≥ K̂. Finally the project is privately feasible if V − K ≥ 0. This implies an
upper bound K ≤ V . Putting the pieces together yields condition C0: K ∈ (K̂, V ).
This complete the proof of proposition 3. It is independent of the cost distribution.
Appendix 3: The Duopoly Case
In this appendix we derive the optimal industrial organization presented in Section 4 of the
paper. When the fixed cost K is sufficiently low private and regulated duopolies are feasible
and may be optimal. We compare two market structures. First we study the welfare proper-
ties of the duopoly under laissez-faire and asymmetric information between firms. Under the
private regime, duopoly is modeled as Cournot quantity setting duopoly with asymmetric in-
formation between firms. Second we study the nature of the ’sampling gain’ in the regulated
duopoly structure under asymmetric information. Indeed many contributions in procurement
and regulation theory emphasize that despite sub-additive cost functions, it can be optimal to
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have several producers in a regulatory setting. A regulated duopoly can be better than a reg-
ulated monopoly because it reduces prices through (yardstick, sampling) competition. In the
present model, the firms’ marginal cost are independent and identically distributed. The benefit
of choosing a regulated duopoly originates from the sampling gain as first analyzed by Auriol
and Laffont (1993). The sampling gain results from the government’s ability to choose the least
cost technology out of the two possible technologies offered by the duopoly. Under the regu-
lated regime, managers of duopoly are offered incentive compatible contracts with asymmetric
information between the two firms and between firms and goverment. Finally we derive a suf-
ficient condition that guarantees that regulated public duopolies dominates laissez-faire private
duopoly.
Note that we restrict our attention to the situation in which all firms are either regulated
or privatized. The restriction that the same ownership structure applies for all the firms in
the market, is made for the sake of simplicity. It indeed helps the exposition by avoiding
cumbersome comparison with an additional industry structure. The ’mixed oligopoly’, where
some firms are regulated while other are run by private investors, has been partially studied in
the case of complete information by Cremer, Marchand and Thisse (1989) and Picard (2001).
They show that the presence of a single (high cost) regulated firm can be used to increase
welfare by raising output and lowering prices in oligopolistic markets. Here we go further by
deriving sufficient conditions under which a regulated duopoly always bring more welfare than a
private duopoly. Private duopoly leads to excessive entry and productive inefficiency (both firms
produce although one is more efficient than the other). By contrast in the regulated duopoly
only the most efficient firm produces. The ’mixed duopoly’ cannot bring the benefit of this
sampling gain. It suffers from the same drawback as the private duopoly in the sense that it
leads to productive inefficiency. In what follows we leave aside the study of mixed duopoly to
focus on the sampling gain.
As presented in the paper, we rule out franchising. The results are nevertheless robust to
more favorable specifications of the franchise fee.32
32Considering F > 0 would reinforce the bias in favor of the private monopoly in the sequel because
franchise fees are higher with a private monopoly than with a private duopoly (i.e., K
PD/PM
would
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A4 F (λ) ≡ 0 .
Private duopoly
Private duopoly (PD here after) is modeled as Cournot duopoly with asymmetric information
between firms. Each firm gets private information on its own marginal cost but it is not informed
about the competitor’s marginal cost. As in any Cournot game, each firm maximizes its profit
taking the other firm’s output as given. The timing of the game is as follows: First both firms
simultaneously make the investments K. Second, each firm i ∈ {1, 2} learns the realization of its
own marginal cost βi and chooses its production level qi. The equilibrium concept is Bayesian
Nash equilibrium:
q∗i ∈ argmaxqi Eβj
[
(a− b(qi + q∗j ))qi − βiqi
]
∀i = 1, 2, j 6= i.
Due to the linear shapes of the demand and cost functions, firm i’s optimal strategy is equal
to q∗i (βi) = (2a+ Eβ − 3βi) /6b.33 The existence of a duopoly with both firms producing at the
equilibrium requires that a ≥ (3β¯ − Eβ) /2, which is true under assumption A1. Substituting
(q∗1(β1), q∗2(β2)) in (4) and (5), we compute the ex-ante firm profit and the industry welfare of
the Cournot duopoly
EΠPD =
4
9
V +
5
18
σ2
2b
−K, (27)
EWPD =
16
9
V +
11
18
σ2
2b
− 2K. (28)
A duopoly is privately feasible if the two firms are ex-ante profitable. It means that expression
(27) should be positive.34 A private duopoly is socially desirable if it brings more welfare than
decrease). Empirically Wallsten (2001) finds using panel data of 17 developing countries that exclusivity
periods (i.e., temporary monopoly position) can double the firm’s sale price (i.e., F ) in telecommunication
industry.
33For more on Cournot competition under asymmetric information see Sakai (1985), Shapiro (1986)
and Raith (1996).
34The expected profit of N firms playing a generalized Cournot competition is ENΠi = 4V(N+1)2 +
(N−1)(N+3)
2(N+1)2
σ2
2b −K with N ≥ 1. We deduce that if V4 + 38 σ
2
2b ≤ K ≤ 4V9 + 518 σ
2
2b then N ∈ {0, 1, 2}. This
yields assumption A0.
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a private monopoly. That is, if EWPD ≥ EWPM . Let KPD/PM be the level of fixed cost
such that the government is indifferent between a private duopoly and a private monopoly, i.e.
EWPD = EWPM . From (8) and (28), we compute
KPD/PM =
5
18
V +
11
18
σ2
2b
. (29)
Walras (1936) and Spence (1976) have shown in a context of symmetric information that
industries with increasing returns to scale were characterized by excess entry. The next re-
sult shows that the presence of asymmetric information does not alter this result of wasteful
competition.
Lemma A1 Under asymmetric information there is excessive entry. Privately feasible duopolies
are socially undesirable whenever 518V +
11
18
σ2
2b ≤ K ≤ 49V + 518 σ
2
2b .
The set of values of fixed costs defined by the condition in Lemma A1 is not empty. One can
indeed show that that condition is equivalent to a > Eβ +
√
3σ which is true under assumption
A1. Therefore, the ex-ante welfare is higher if a private monopoly is legally set and if entry is
prevented. Indeed, firms do not internalize the social cost of the investment duplication in their
entry decision. As a result they enter too often in the industry.
Regulated duopoly
Under the regulated regime, managers of duopolies are offered incentive compatible contracts
with asymmetric information between the two firms and between firms and goverment. We first
examine the case of symmetric information and the sampling gain benefiting to the government.
We next turn to the case of asymmetric information.
The sampling effect under symmetric information
The timing is the same as for a regulated monopoly with the following differences: the investment
K is made in the two regulated firms (henceforth RD) and the marginal cost parameters βi
with i ∈ {1, 2} are independently drawn. Under symmetric information the transfers t∗i to
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the regulated firms i ∈ {1, 2} which are socially costly, are reduced until firms break even:
t∗i = −(a− bQ)qi + βiqi +K. Substituting this expression into the welfare function yields
WRD∗ = S(Q) + λP (Q)Q− (1 + λ)(β1q1 + β2q2 + 2K).
The welfare function is linear in q1 and q2. Optimizing it with respect to qi we deduce that
q∗i = QRD > 0 if βi = min{β1, β2} and q∗i = 0 otherwise. The optimal production level
coincides with the level of the regulated monopoly defined in equation (10): QRD∗(β1, β2) =
QRM∗(min{β1, β2}). Monitoring a regulated duopoly is equivalent to monitoring a regulated
monopoly for which the investment level is 2K and the marginal cost is distributed as βmin =
min{β1, β2}, that is, with the law:
gmin(β) = 2(1−G(β))g(β). (30)
The ex-ante welfare of the regulated duopoly under symmetric information is
EWRD∗(λ) = 2(1 + λ)
(
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
V min −K
)
(31)
where
V min =
∫ β¯
β
(a− β)2
4b
gmin(β)dβ. (32)
The facts that gmin(·) stochastically dominates g(·) and that (a− β)2/(4b) decreases in β imply
that V min > V . Then comparing (11) and (31), the ex-ante welfare is larger under a regulated
duopoly than under a regulated monopoly if the sampling gain, measured by 2
(
V min − V )
(1 + λ) / (1 + 2λ), is larger than K, the duplicated investment.35
Asymmetric information
Under asymmetric information, the two regulated firms must be enticed to reveal their private
information to the government. By the revelation principle, the analysis is restricted to direct
35Only one firm produces at the equilibrium. This is an artifact of the assumption of constant mar-
ginal costs which is used to isolate the sampling effect. Models with non-constant marginal costs yield
qualitatively similar results (see Auriol and Laffont 1993). Finally we assume that the government shuts
down the least efficient regulated firm for the sake of readability. It could instead transfer the best tech-
nology to all regulated firms and share the optimal production QRD∗ among them. The analysis would
be unaltered.
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revelation mechanisms. The equilibrium is defined as truthful Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Each
firm i ∈ {1, 2} sets its revelation strategy β̂i such that it maximizes the expected profit given
the cost distribution of the competitor j 6= i. Let c(β, λ) = β+ λ1+λ G(β)g(β) be the virtual cost. Let
V RD(λ) =
∫ β¯
β
(a− c(β, λ))2
4b
gmin(β)dβ. (33)
The following lemma presents the structure of production and the welfare level of the duopoly
under asymmetric information.
Lemma A2 Under asymmetric information, only the firm with the lowest marginal cost pro-
duces. Output and welfare levels are the levels obtained under symmetric information evaluated
at the virtual cost:
QRD(β1, β2) = QRM (c(βmin, λ)) , (34)
EWRD(λ) = 2(1 + λ)
(
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
V RD(λ)−K
)
. (35)
Proof: The proof is similar as in Auriol and Laffont (1993) Proposition 2.
Monitoring a regulated duopoly is equivalent to monitoring a regulated monopoly for which
the investment level is 2K, the marginal cost is c(βmin, λ) and βmin is distributed according to
gmin(·). Let KRM/RD(λ) be the value of the fixed cost such that the government is indifferent
between a regulated monopoly and a regulated duopoly, i.e. such that EWRM (λ) = EWRD(λ):
K
RM/RD
(λ) = 2
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
(
V RD(λ)− V RM (λ)
)
(36)
Under asymmetric information, the sampling gain is measured by K
RM/RD
(λ). We can write
(36) as
K
RM/RD
(λ) =
1
2b
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
∫ β¯
β
(a− c(β, λ))2 [gmin(β)− g(β)] dβ (37)
The function is integrated by part which yields after straightforward computations:
K
RM/RD
(λ) =
1
2b
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
∫ β¯
β
−2(a− c(β, λ))dc(β, λ))
dλ
[Gmin(β)−G(β)] dβ (38)
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The function K
RM/RD
(λ) is positive because the distribution function Gmin(β) stochastically
dominates G(β), because (a− c(β, λ)) is a positive function under A1, and because the virtual
cost is a decreasing function.
dc(β, λ)
dλ
= − 1
(1 + λ)2
G(β)
g(β)
≤ 0.
We deduce that:
K
RM/RD
(λ) =
1
b
1
(1 + 2λ)(1 + λ)
∫ β¯
β
(a− c(β, λ))G(β)
g(β)
[Gmin(β)−G(β)] dβ. (39)
It is easy to check that K
RM/RD
(λ) is a decreasing function of λ: both 1(1+λ)(1+2λ) and the virtual
cost, c(β, λ), decreases with λ. In other words, the larger λ is, the lower is the impact of the
sampling gain and the smaller is the government’s preference for regulated duopoly.
Private versus regulated duopoly
We have seen in Section 3 that private monopoly can be preferred to regulated monopoly. By
extension, private duopoly could also be preferred to monopoly or regulated duopoly. However,
excess entry and weak competition in private Cournot duopolies will generally preclude this
structure from being socially desirable. To be more specific let K
RD/PD
(λ) be the value of the
fixed cost such that the regulated duopoly yields the same welfare level as the private duopoly,
i.e., such that EWRD(λ) = EWPD. The government prefers a regulated duopoly to a private
duopoly if and only if K ≤ KRD/PD(λ). On the other hand, if K ≥ KPD/PM defined in equation
(29), the government prefers a private monopoly to a private duopoly. We deduce that if
C1 K
RD/PD
(λ) ≥ KPD/PM
a private duopoly is never optimal. Indeed, if the government prefers a private duopoly over
a private monopoly (i.e., K < K
PD/PM
), under C1 it also prefers a regulated duopoly rather
than the private duopoly (i.e., K < K
PD/PM
implies that K < K
RD/PD
(λ)) so that the private
duopoly is never optimal.
Condition C1 is likely to be satisfied because the Cournot equilibrium presents larger ineffi-
ciency than the equilibrium in regulated duopolies where the government set the output levels.
42
To illustrate this point, suppose that there is no information asymmetry and no uncertainty
(β = β) so that there is no sampling gain. Then the welfare under a regulated duopoly is
equal to WRD(λ) = 2(1 + λ)
(
1+λ
1+2λV −K
)
whereas the welfare under private Cournot duopoly
(28) is equal to 89V − 2K and the welfare under private monopoly is equal to 32V − K. Ob-
viously private duopolies dominate private monopolies for small enough fixed costs, that is for
K < 169 V − 32V = 1036V . However, if fixed costs are small, the welfare under regulated duopoly is
also large. It is then easy to check that, 2(1 + λ)
(
1+λ
1+2λV −K
)
≥ 89V − 2K ∀λ ≥ 0 if K < 1036V .
In words, the welfare under regulated duopoly is larger than the welfare under private duopoly
for any value of the opportunity cost of public funds when the private duopoly dominates the
private monopoly. This implies that a private duopoly is never optimal.
Now, let us introduce information asymmetry and uncertainty. In this case, two additional
and opposite effects are at work: on the one hand, sampling gains raise the welfare under
regulated duopolies and on the other hand, the increase in the cost variance increases the output
and the welfare of Cournot private duopolies (see (28)). In the case of uniform distribution or
of large demand, the first effect dominates so that a private duopoly is never preferred by the
government.
Lemma A3 Condition C1 is satisfied if the cost β is uniformly distributed over [0, β] or if a is
large enough.
Proof: Condition C1 is equivalent to
18(1 + λ)2
(1 + 2λ)(16 + 5λ)
V RD(λ) ≥ V + 1 + 2λ
16 + 5λ
11σ2
4b
. (40)
Simplifying by 4b, (40) is equivalent to:
18(1 + λ)2
(1 + 2λ)(16 + 5λ)
Eβmin
[
(a− c(β, λ))2
]
≥ Eβ
[
(a− β)2
]
+
(1 + 2λ)11σ2
16 + 5λ
.
Let h(λ) = 18(1+λ)
2
(1+2λ)(16+5λ) − 1 = 2−λ+8λ
2
(1+2λ)(16+5λ) > 0 ∀λ ≥ 0. Let Φ(λ) = Eβmin
[
c(β, λ)2
]
+
Eβmin [(c(β,λ)2]−Eβ[β2]
h(λ) − (1+2λ)11σ
2
(16+5λ)h(λ) . Let also ξ(λ) = Eβmin [c(β, λ)]+
E
βmin
[c(β,λ)]−Eβ
h(λ) . The condition
C1 defined in (40) is equivalent to:
a2 − 2ξ(λ)a+Φ(λ) ≥ 0.
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This condition, which requires that a is large enough, is not very strong. For instance, one can
check that with a uniform distribution over [0, β], and with the convention that a = αβ, condition
C1 is equivalent to: H(α, λ) = 12α2(8λ2−λ+2)+12α(4−7λ)(1+2λ)+(1+2λ)(44λ−59) ≥ 0.
Under the assumption A1 (i.e. α ≥ 2), it is easy to check that H(α, λ) is increasing in α for all
λ ≥ 0. We deduce that H(α, λ) ≥ H(2, λ) = 136λ2 − 98λ + 133 > 0 ∀λ ≥ 0. So, for a uniform
distribution, assumption A1 is a sufficient condition to get C1. More generally, let
al = ξ(λ) +
{
ξ(λ)2 − Φ(λ)
}1/2
. (41)
If a is larger than al condition C1 is satisfied. QED
Lemma A3 yields the following, more general version of Proposition 4.
Proposition A4 Under assumption C1 a private duopoly is never optimal.
Proposition 4 shows that a private Cournot duopoly is never optimal. The negative impact
of market power and excessive entry are too strong compared to the positive effects (here the
‘sampling gains’) of a regulated duopoly. In other words, the advantage of private structures
with liberalized prices disappears once the market allows the entry of more than one firm (i.e.
when it is very profitable). This result may look at odds with theories where private structures
perform better with larger number of entrants (see for instance Vickers and Yarrow (1991) and
Segal (1998)). A basic difference in our model lies in the intensity of competition that exists
within private and regulated structures. Under privatization, private firms compete in quantities
so that the addition of a firm does not fully eliminate market power and profits. In contrast,
under the regulation regime, information costs dramatically fall when a second firm is added
in the regulated market. Regulation is then more attractive. This result is congruent with the
theory of adverse selection in which a rise in the number of agents reduces the cost of information
revelation (see Auriol and Laffont (1993)).36 The case where regulated duopoly is preferred to
36If we had considered that firms operating in the same industry have correlated costs, we would
have used this correlation to implement yardstick competition, reducing further the cost of information
revelation (see Auriol and Laffont 1993).
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regulated monopoly is depicted in Figure 2 by the hatched area below the curveK
RM/RD
denoted
RD.
The fact that a private duopoly is not optimal sheds light on the link between market liberal-
ization, on the one hand, and technological and/or product demand changes, on the other hand.
Market liberalization, often referred to as ‘deregulation’, corresponds to the divestiture of the
historical monopoly and the introduction of new entrants. As shown in Proposition 5 this is not
equivalent to laissez-faire. In practice prices and entry remain regulated to protect consumers
against collusion and predatory behavior (through licences and price caps for instance). This is
important because in profitable industry the consumer surplus is high. Monopoly pricing then
has more impact on welfare than it has on low profitability industry. In the framework of our
model the divestiture of the historical monopoly is motivated by a drop of the ratio K/V . That
is, by smaller fixed costs and/or by larger product demand. In figure 2 this corresponds to a
downward shift, where industry structures move from regulated monopoly to regulated duopoly.
The mobile and internet segment of the telecommunication industry provides an example of such
a drop. Introduction of wireless technologies has significantly reduced the fixed costs to operate
networks whereas the demand for communication has steadily increased. Consistently with our
model, many developed and developing countries have deregulated their domestic telecommu-
nication industry. Wallsten (2001), who studied telecom reforms in Africa and Latin America,
found that privatization by itself does not yield improvements but that privatization combined
with an independent regulator does.37 Similarly Estache (2002), shows that technical/productive
efficiency gains generated by Argentina’s 1990s utilities privatization have not been transmitted
to consumers. According to the author the benefits were captured by the industry because
of inefficient regulation. The lesson to be drawn here is that privatization, being defined as a
move from regulation to laissez-faire, is not optimal. When the ratio K/V is low, the consumer
surplus is large.38 Regulation then is a key component of successful privatization reforms.
37For more on the telecommunications reforms in developing countries see Auriol (2005).
38For instance Fuss, Meschi and Waverman (2005) estimates that in a typical developing country,
an increase of ten mobile phones per 100 people boosts growth by 0.6 percentage points. The growth
dividend is similar to that of fixed-lines phones in developed countries in the 1970s.
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Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 5
In this appendix we prove the general version of proposition 5 (i.e., for general distribution of
cost parameter).
Proposition 6 Suppose that assumptions A0 to A4 hold. Under condition C1, the optimal
industrial policy under asymmetric information is to set:
• no production if K > max
{
V,K
RM
(λ)
}
;
• a private monopoly if KRM/PM (λ) < K ≤ V ;
• a regulated monopoly if KRM/RD(λ) < K ≤ min
{
K
RM/PM
(λ), V
}
or if V ≤ K < KRM (λ);
• a regulated duopoly if K ≤ KRM/RD(λ).
Condition C1 implies that a private duopoly is never optimal. The choice is between, no
production, private monopoly, regulated monopoly or regulated duopoly. First of all recall
that K
RM/RD
(λ), defined equation (36), is the value of the fixed cost such that the govern-
ment is indifferent between a regulated monopoly and a regulated duopoly (i.e. such that
EWRM (λ) = EWRD(λ)). A regulated monopoly is preferred to a regulated duopoly if and only
if K ≥ KRM/RD(λ). Similarly a regulated monopoly is preferred to no production whenever
K ≤ KRM (λ), defined equation (20). It is preferred to privatisation whenever K ≤ KRM/PM (λ),
defined equation (21). Comparing equations (20) and (21) one can check that K
RM
(λ) >
K
RM/PM
(λ) for all λ ≥ λˆ defined equation (17) (for λ < λˆ privatization is never an option so
that K
RM/PM
(λ) is not defined). Moreover using the fact that gmin(β) ≤ 2g(β), one can check
that V RD(λ) < 2V RM (λ) so that K
RM
(λ) > K
RM/RD
(λ). We deduce that if K > K
RM
(λ)
regulation is never optimal. On the other hand if K > V privatisation is not possible. Putting
all the pieces together yields the result.
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